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The recent financial crisis and its aftershocks have reshaped the world of 
financial engineering, quantitative analysis, and derivatives trading. 
Government intervention, regulatory reform, and the refutation of 
fundamental axioms and model assumptions are three reshaping forces 
now confronting quantitative practitioners. 
 
In 1993, the U.S. Congress canceled the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) 
project. At an estimated cost of $12 billion, the project would have created the 
largest linear particle accelerator in the world and would likely have provided 	 ﾠ
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years of employment for large numbers of physicists in the United States. But 
after the cancellation, the job market for academic physicists collapsed and 
many moved into finance and quantitative analysis. 
This generation of quantitatively trained analysts (quants)—the SSC 
generation—catalyzed a remarkable growth of financial engineering and 
quantitative analysis. The 20 years following the cancellation of the SSC 
witnessed a flurry of technological and computational advances that led to 
increasingly sophisticated modeling and analytical capabilities. These advances 
were coupled with growth in financial markets—growth in volume, 
sophistication, complexity, and depth of traded products, especially in 
derivatives markets. The universe of traded products grew dramatically with 
only a few setbacks: for example, the Orange County debacle in 1993 and the 
Russian debt crisis and the collapse of Long-Term Capital Management in 
1998. 
The purpose of this presentation is to examine three forces that are now 
reshaping the landscape engineered by the SSC generation during the past 20 
years: 
1.  Empirical challenges to basic logical arguments of quantitative 
finance  
2.  Government intervention 
3.  Regulatory reform 
  
Three Reshaping Forces 
The three forces reshaping the financial markets each have distinct 
characteristics, yet there is interplay among them, and all are still playing out.  
Market phenomena that investors have experienced in the last three 
years have shaken laypeople and practitioners alike. Practitioners are having to 
reconsider how they assess value, manage risk, set bounds and order prices, 
and conduct relative value. On occasion, they have been stunned by the 
phenomena they have observed in the market. These experiences have led to 	 ﾠ
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empirical lessons that reach beyond the tactical level of simply replacing one 
conventional model with another. These lessons represent foundational 
challenges to basic statements of logic that practitioners have been using in 
quantitative fixed income for decades.  
The second force, which was catalyzed by the crisis itself, is government 
intervention and policy reaction. Since the initial responses in 2007—for 
example, the extension of the discount window in August 2007—a whole suite 
of unusual responses has followed and is continuing to evolve. Such responses 
are affecting the assessment of value in markets generally but especially in 
fixed-income markets. 
Regulatory reform, the third reshaping force, is a complicated and 
difficult topic. The Dodd–Frank Act and Basel III are shifting the landscape for 
derivative products and other fixed-income investments and thus changing the 
way investors think about value opportunities and the exploitations of 
mispricing in this universe.  
I view the new landscape as one that is undergoing tectonic shifts. It is 
not yet clear which buildings will be fit to reinhabit after this shift, but we are 
certainly operating in a significantly reshaped investment space. 
For example, in 2003 Mark Joshi wrote that “if we pick the right 
government, this possibility [of government default] is sufficiently remote that 
we can for practical purposes neglect it. If this seems unreasonable, consider 
that if the British, American, or German government reached such straits, the 
world’s financial system would be in such a mess that there would be precious 
few banks left to employ financial mathematicians.”1 Yet, the risk of 
government default is now at the heart of fixed-income markets, and Joshi’s 
assertion reflects well the mindset of many practitioners within the quantitative 
investment space before the crisis.  
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1Mark S. Joshi, The Concepts and Practice of Mathematical Finance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003):1.	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Such practitioners were operating as if the 15- to 20-year dataset that 
they had experienced in their own careers essentially incorporated the 
universal set of all possible outcomes. They have learned that this view is not 
accurate. The actual universe of possible outcomes and price action is vastly 
different from that which people have experienced in the past 20 years. The 
limited set of data and the limited experience of market participants are 
combined with products that themselves have only existed for a similarly short 
period. For example, the first recorded swap occurred in 1981 between the 
World Bank and IBM, and reliable data have been available only since the 
1990s.  
At a broad level, the financial world experienced a misspecification of the 
set of possible outcomes. People were spending energy on quantitative 
modeling and being precise about their models conditional on the world of the 
previous 20 years essentially continuing into the future. That practice was 
rendered useless once investors realized that the set of possible outcomes was 
far larger. Throughout the Lehman Brothers crisis, for example, fundamental 
and logically sound arguments were challenged and found inadequate, thus 
forcing practitioners to reassess how they manage risk and make investment 
decisions.  
 
Empirical Challenges to Fundamental Arguments  
Three examples illustrate the challenges that confronted practitioners and their 
assumptions about price action and market behavior: 
1.  The conundrum of uncollateralized versus collateralized funding rates 
2.  Arbitrage within off-balance-sheet derivatives markets 
3.  Violation of the triangle inequality 
 
Collateralized vs. Uncollateralized Funding. The conundrum of 
collateralized versus uncollateralized funding can be seen in the Treasury and 
swap markets. The argument is that collateralized funding, particularly that 	 ﾠ
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secured by government debt, should be cheaper than uncollateralized funding, 
as measured by LIBOR rates. The rate for uncollateralized funding must be 
higher because if market participants could borrow more cheaply on an 
uncollateralized basis than collateralized basis then they could simply opt to 
keep their Treasury collateral.  
Simple logic thus concludes that LIBOR rates must be higher than repo 
rates, which has indeed been true. In Figure 1, I show that the Treasury 
Eurodollar (TED) spread, which is the difference between three-month LIBOR 
and the three-month T-bill interest rate (a good proxy for repo rates), has 
always been positive; indeed, it tends to widen in times of financial stress. This 
fundamental logical argument—uncollateralized funding is at a higher rate 
than collateralized funding—predicated trading for the 20 years before the 
crisis.   
We can now construct a straightforward trade in Treasury, repo, and 
swap markets that builds on this logic. An investor buys a Treasury bond and 
obtains repo financing for the Treasury bond from a repo counterparty. As 
illustrated in Exhibit 1, the investor also enters into an interest rate swap of 
matched maturity to the Treasury bond against LIBOR. When this trade is 
collapsed down, the investor is net receiving LIBOR less the repo rate on the 
floating side, which by the argument earlier must be positive. Furthermore, on 
the fixed side the investor is paying the swap rate less the bond yield, which is 
known as the swap spread. Because the investor is receiving a positive quantity 
and paying the swap spread, the conclusion is that the swap spread must be 
positive or else there is an arbitrage. This straightforward logical argument that 
swap spreads must be positive was taken for granted until 2008. 
From the inception of liquid swap markets until 2008, the 30-year swap 
spread was indeed positive, as Figure 2 shows. Then, a month after Lehman 
Brothers collapsed, the spread moved negative, going down to nearly –50 bps, 
and it remains negative as of late 2011, even as other markets have 
normalized. Something in this foundational argument has failed.  	 ﾠ
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Market participants have spent much time in recent years trying to 
explain why the swap spread is negative. Reasons put forward include 
increased financing haircuts, balance sheet constraints, supply of government 
debt, reduction of risk appetite and mark-to-market tolerance, and in 
particular, deterioration of U.S. sovereign credit. These are all plausible 
arguments, but they were not being made in 2007, and a completely 
satisfactory answer has not yet been reached. 
 
Off-Balance-Sheet Arbitrage. Two further compelling examples come 
from derivatives activities in which there are no explicit balance-sheet 
constraints.  
First, consider options on swaps (called “swaptions”) in the interest rate 
derivatives market. The most basic style is the European swaption, which has 
one exercise date to enter into a swap. Another style is called the “Bermudan 
swaption” (or “American swaption”), which allows for multiple exercise dates to 
enter into a swap. Because a Bermudan swaption offers more optionality, it is 
in theory more valuable than a European swaption. To prove this bound, 
assume that it does not exist and construct an arbitrage portfolio. For example, 
if I can buy a Bermudan swaption more cheaply than I can sell a European 
swaption, identical in all terms other than the multiple exercise dates, then I 
have been paid to enter a portfolio whose payout is always bounded below by 
zero. 
Now, consider an interest rate floor versus a Bermudan swaption. An 
interest rate floor is, in essence, the sum of a number of options for each 
subperiod of a swap. If I match an interest rate floor with the strike prices, 
dates, and expiration details of a Bermudan receiver swaption, a similar 
argument shows that the interest rate floor must have greater value than the 
Bermudan. If not, I can construct an arbitrage portfolio.  
Such conclusions arise from fundamentally sound logical arguments that 
have ordered the value of products since derivatives markets began. But after 
Lehman Brothers collapsed, investors were able to buy an interest rate floor 	 ﾠ
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cheaper than the exact matched Bermudan swaption, thus violating the 
bounds that had previously always held. The reason for this violation of 
bounds is not clear. Perhaps it was because of the long-dated nature of the 
trade or a broad reduction of risk appetite. Whatever the cause, fundamental 
bounds no longer held and the market was unsettled.  
 
Violation of Triangle Inequality. The third example relates to the 
triangle inequality, which states that the sum of the lengths of any two sides of 
a triangle must be greater than or equal to the length of the remaining side. 
Disturbing violations of this inequality began to occur after Lehman Brothers 
collapsed. 
For example, consider two call options on Asset A and Asset B. Let the 
first option have strike price K1 and value X, and the second have strike K2 and 
value Y. Now, consider a third call option on asset A + B with strike K1 + K2 
and value Z. An inspection of payouts shows that it must have the triangle 
inequality X + Y ≥ Z. If not, then arbitrageurs can buy the first two options, sell 
the third, and construct an arbitrage portfolio. 
After Lehman Brothers’ collapse, however, investors were able to buy an 
option on an underlying (such as a 2-year interest rate), buy an option on the 
10-year interest rate minus the 2-year interest rate, and sell an option on the 
10-year rate, collecting premium upfront and matching all strikes and 
maturities. This example thus violated the triangle inequality. 
 
No Axiom of Choice. The current situation is challenging for both 
quants and derivatives investors because neither is now certain about how to 
order prices, let alone assess value. An analogy from mathematics may be 
helpful in explaining the new landscape. At the heart of logic is the “Axiom of 
Choice,” which involves certain assumptions about choosing elements from an 
uncountable, infinite number of sets. The Axiom of Choice is required for 
particular properties of the real numbers to hold—for example, the well-	 ﾠ
© 2011 CFA Institute   
ordering of the real numbers. Without the Axiom of Choice, mathematics can 
still be done, but it becomes far messier. 
The landscape of quantitative finance today is the equivalent of 
mathematics without the axiom of choice. As shown in the examples earlier, 
certain basic ordering of prices no longer holds. In such an environment, 
quantitative products still exist, but derivatives pricing, model building, and 
risk management become far more complex.  
 
Government Intervention 
Government response to the 2008 financial crisis led to massive intervention in 
public markets that initially alleviated several problems. Liquidity and market 
functionality were returned to several sectors, and panic levels regarding the 
systematic risk of corporate default were reduced significantly. Two programs 
were especially effective. The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) 
targeted the funding of banks, which were subsequently able to resume taking 
intelligent risks. Quantitative Easing (QE), particularly QE1, normalized the 
Treasury market, which then helped restart risk taking as private investors 
observed government capital being applied to sensible trades.  
In a case at Harvard Business School, we discussed dislocation in the 
Treasury market in late 2008 and early 2009, and how that shaped the 
evolution of government intervention. Treasuries of the same maturity were 
trading 70 bps apart. Clearly, investors were not going to be buying more 
structured or exotic assets in that situation. The Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP) was doomed in its initial format, when Treasury bonds themselves 
offered tremendous relative value but there was no risk capital available. No 
one was willing to go down the risk spectrum at that time.  
But the combination of TLGP and QE1 suggested that the government 
was behaving in a rational and deliberate manner. First, it was involved in 
Treasury relative value itself, buying cheap bonds. Second, it was providing 
access to funding for banks who could themselves get involved in these trades. 	 ﾠ
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These steps normalized the market and promoted a cascade of risk taking 
down the risk spectrum, flowing through Treasuries, Treasury Inflation-
Protected Securities (TIPS), mortgages, and then into stocks. 
In contrast to the treasury market, some markets in 2009 were 
overwhelmed by government intervention. A stressed mortgage market was 
initially normalized by QE1 purchases, but the size of the program was so vast 
that the mortgage market then shifted from being normalized to being stressed 
again as investors were confronted by delivery and financing issues. Thus, 
overwhelming government intervention distorted traditional assessments of 
value in the mortgage market. 
A second phase of the crisis has now developed and fears are rising that 
the global economy is entering a European version of a Lehman-like collapse. 
Government intervention has itself moved into a new phase of remarkable 
extension of accommodation. For example, vast government intervention has 
occurred along the yield curve in the form of QE3 (the Federal Reserve’s 
“operation twist”). Yet, one has to question whether QE3 is as sensible as QE1. 
Investors find it difficult to appraise a market in which more than $400 billion 
of long-dated treasuries are being bought by the government. I am less 
optimistic that the current intervention will normalize markets and restore 
confidence in a manner as effective as 2009. 
Unusual government intervention that is challenging other bounds of 
quantitative finance is occurring elsewhere around the world. For example, the 
Swiss franc market is experiencing empirical price action that challenges 
standard logical reasoning. Following significant Swiss National Bank 
intervention, interest rates have been negative for several months. A one-year 
swap rate of –25 bps	 ﾠis a challenge to most usual logical assumptions. 
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The third reshaping force is market regulation that is currently in an extensive 
rule-making process with many complex pieces of legislation. All institutions 
are involved in trying to assess the impact of the reforms.  
As a special entity, Harvard Management Company (HMC) is in an 
interesting position. There was initially a possibility, no longer likely, that 
dealers might have to owe us a fiduciary responsibility, which is not what a 
professional investor would want. The key overriding characteristic of the 
current regulatory environment is great uncertainty. The debate itself seems to 
have moving goalposts or even moving playing fields. 
A certain amount of delay and pushback on rule making has occurred, 
but it remains likely that significant changes will be made that affect how 
investors can trade. Uncertainty remains about risk-taking ability and 
incentive within financial institutions. For example, the Volcker Rule reduces 
the amount of risk allowed to be taken systemwide. Furthermore, substantial 
changes have occurred in margining, clearing, and reporting requirements. 
Margining requirements for uncleared trades in particular will change the 
capital costs of doing trades and thus reshape markets. 
Many aims of the regulatory process are highly sensible. One is to 
collapse $450 trillion of derivatives down to its vastly smaller net amount, thus 
significantly reducing systemic risk in the case of a bankruptcy. A second aim 
is to require appropriate capitalization of derivatives trading activities. As the 
rules are rewritten for capital requirements and margining, however, some 
participants may find it is no longer viable to trade in this space or that certain 
strategies are no longer viable. For example, banks have already stopped 
making markets in certain sectors of interest rate markets.  
One of the intellectual appeals of finance is the quest to discover a 
structure or risk that seems dislocated (perhaps because of retail flows or 
market segmentation) around which a compelling trade opportunity can be 
constructed—not necessarily just in duration space but in higher order 
parameters, such as volatility or correlation. Risk that becomes dislocated or 
mispriced presents opportunities for well-capitalized investors seeking returns 	 ﾠ
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and outperformance. HMC’s investment performance is judged relative to an 
asset allocation or policy portfolio.  We thus care about the outperformance or 
“alpha” opportunity set, and we know this set may shrink in certain ways, if 
only because there will be reduced dimensionality of traded products. The SSC 
generation has seen only increases in the set of traded products during the 
past 20 years and we are now seeing a retrenchment. The participant set in 
this smaller world, however, may also be shrinking because of less leverage, 
less risk taking, and increased capital requirements generally.  
Capital requirements for uncleared trades have yet to be set, but oddities 
seem likely to occur. For example, in a bilateral derivatives transaction the risk 
is symmetrical between the client and the dealer. Currently, an institution like 
HMC will have to post initial margin on a transaction to the dealer (and not the 
other way round) even though the dealer may have a significantly lower credit 
rating. This requirement would only increase credit exposure to a lower rated 
counterparty, which may cause highly rated institutions to withdraw from the 
market thus reducing market liquidity.  
Whether regulatory reform will lead to an alpha deprivation or an alpha 
dividend is a question integral to quantitative investment managers. If certain 
investment spaces cease to exist, some quants may need to put down their 
calculators and retrain.  
 
Navigating the New Landscape 
Uncertainty is the primary characteristic of the new investment landscape. 
Investors need to assess probabilities, make investment decisions, and manage 
risk within a much larger conditioning set of possible outcomes. Ranking a 
scoreboard of possible trades by attractiveness and by the best place to put 
capital at risk is now significantly harder. 
Market participants can no longer rely on certain logical arguments. At 
the very least, they will have to adjust statements of relative value because past 
relationships they had taken for granted may not always hold. Furthermore, 	 ﾠ
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governments are making large interventions that may or may not be deemed 
rational and that will likely swamp private investors. Even the simply stated 
question of where yields should be has become much harder to answer.  
Finally, investors must be prepared to fathom and adapt to a new 
regulatory framework. For example, an attractive trade that now involves 
increased margining to a lower-rated counterparty may no longer make sense. 
The attractiveness of a trade with arbitrage characteristics may also be affected 
by the fact that liquidity in relevant markets may evaporate. Perhaps many 
more markets will go the way of the Japanese inflation-linked bond market, of 
which all that remains is a vestigial market. Investors are understandably 
cautious.  
Conversely, we may now begin to observe a richer set of possible 
opportunities arising from the interplay of government regulation, government 
policy, and the strange and messier market that now exists.   
 
 	 ﾠ
© 2011 CFA Institute   
 
Question and Answer Session 
Stephen Blyth 
 
Question: How widely accepted in the industry is this view of reshaping forces? 
 
Blyth: Views among sell-side CEOs and heads of divisions are nuanced and 
can vary widely. Some industry leaders agree that the model is changing, that 
return on equity must unavoidably be lower, that capital ratios will have to be 
better, and that compensation will be lower.  
They are ready to embrace the change. Others believed until recently that 
current conditions are more of a blip (a major blip) and that the markets will 
soon revert to the more levered model and trading of the early 2000s. This 
second view is unrealistic to me. Overall, today I see views that are more 
realistic than at the end of 2009. 
 
Question: What are your thoughts on forward-looking scenario analysis? 
 
Blyth: I am skeptical of scenario analysis as a panacea because it depends on 
the scenarios chosen and the response function to these scenarios. Analysts 
can run as many scenarios as they like, but if they do not consider how the 
institution might respond, then the analysis is not that helpful. For example, 
one might run a scenario of equity markets being down 30 percent, under 
which an investment portfolio is down 25 percent. This analysis may not be 
particularly informative.  
We should not restrict ourselves to the historical dataset, and we should 
certainly not be tempted to assume, because conditions seem more stable now, 
that the maxima and minima of 2008–2009 are global maxima and minima. 
Many former hedge fund strategies were predicated on the idea that conditions 
could never get worse than the extremes of the Long-Term Capital Management 	 ﾠ
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collapse in 1998. Now, some investment managers are saying that conditions 
will never be worse than the Lehman collapse. Unfortunately, a lot of situations 
present worse possibilities than the financial crisis.  
So, investors have to be creative in accepting the strange things that 
have happened and additional ones that could happen. This concept is in some 
sense the subtext of this presentation: We should not build a new investment 
process conditional on now knowing the extremes.  
 
Question: What are your thoughts about behavioral finance as opposed to 
quantitative finance? 
 
Blyth: I am agnostic. Finance is all about people making decisions and 
learning from experience, and those things are subjective. Even statistics as a 
discipline is subjective because whatever tool one uses, decisions are being 
made based on experience, interpretations of data, choice of statistical method, 
and choice of dataset. Experience and judgment play a role, regardless of the 
quantitative toolkit one uses.  
Sometimes sophisticated quantitative models inform the decision 
process; sometimes the models used are less sophisticated. A subjective 
element always exists, even in algorithmic funds. Ultimately, people decide 
which models to put in their algorithmic funds and how and when to switch 
them on and off. Subjectivity is intrinsic.  
 
Question: What are your thoughts on the hedge fund industry and the 
implications for investors who have placed money with third-party managers? 
 
Blyth: There was a shakeout on the buy side following the crisis. For example, 
a middle tier of fixed-income, relative-value funds no longer exists. Large 
multistrategy and macro funds have been more successful. There have been 
relatively few new participants with varying degrees of success.  	 ﾠ
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Participation in more complex, higher-dimensional strategies is lower, 
with a migration of risk toward exchange-traded and more liquid products. 
That seems to be a natural response to the liquidity evaporation. Fewer players 
seem to exist in some areas where HMC has expertise, which may create an 
alpha dividend for us. 
Overall hedge funds seem to have been more stable in this environment 
than one might have expected.  
 
Question: Do we need a market maker of last resort? 
 
Blyth: We certainly did not initially have a coordinated response in 2008, but it 
evolved into something that was effective. Because the crisis was occurring 
during a handover between administrations, a strange bipartisanship occurred 
that became surprisingly effective.  
Unfortunately, political conditions are now quite different. I spend a lot of 
time trying to explain why the debt ceiling brinkmanship of 2011 was so 
devastating for market confidence. It was hard for people to understand that 
market participants were naturally going to respond to such brinkmanship 
with the sale of risk assets, even though the final agreement was not far from 
what one might have expected a priori.  
The concept of a market maker of last resort is quite useful, and the U.S. 
government essentially acted effectively in that role in early 2009. The 
government issuing debt essentially for free when T-bill rates were zero and 
buying cheap liquid assets like Treasuries is acting like a well-run hedge fund. 
It is quite appealing because it obviously stabilizes and normalizes markets 
and it catalyzes private risk taking.  
Such a market maker on a global level is more difficult to imagine. It 
certainly seems unfeasible to me. Consider the debate about the Fed’s 
operation twist and the heated language now being used. In a world full of 
autonomous democracies, a globally funded response is probably implausible. 
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Question: Many prominent investors have labeled derivatives “weapons of 
mass destruction.” Can such a statement become a self-fulfilling prophecy? 
 
Blyth: I expect regulation to address appropriate capitalization of derivatives. 
The concept of being able to enter into a derivative trade without appropriate 
capital charge will likely be a thing of the past.  
Complexity is another important issue. The market developed 
sophisticated derivative models but these can become detached from the 
products. Investors must remember that derivative products are priced 
according to the primal supply and demand of the market, and not according 
to a model. When this break becomes large, the potential for destruction is 
great. Add size and high leverage, and mass destruction is possible.  
 
Question: Considering that HMC is rated higher than most counterparties, 
how do you feel about counterparty risk management and counterparty 
collateral management? 
 
Blyth: Like most institutions, we value the clearing process if the exchange is 
suitably capitalized.  
We care about mark to market and collateralization with each 
counterparty, but we also care about our risk exposure to each counterparty 
given that at the instant of default we have significant gap risk to the risk 
replacement process, even if adequately collateralized to current valuations. 
 
 
 
 